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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 1)1 APPEAL 
1. Wh* • : .• -leienuant ' - ccnMCLii n should be reversed 
because it was based on a plea which was not voluntarily given with 
an accurate understanding of the * i ivum stance s. 
2. Whether the defendant was afforded effective and competent 
counsel when the defendant1.-: public defender failed to explain the 
grounus . * • • • • . • . ;Cfc-(1L , .i. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This i' in jpptMl pur/. \ :i.: : Stc: va ' :i~26(2^fb^ TTfah ncde 
of Criminal Procedure, Rule M b ) >f 'he Rules of < ze -'tan .'ourj of 
Appeals -ma S U L ^ . Gibbons , /^u . 'i ] 
appeal •- * •.. menial ' defendant , Mot.on I-J vacate .Judgment 
which v-i>- denied by order or che Third District Court - and for 
Tooele County, State of' * ; - ^ ^ . :e, 
on March 1 J , 1 "^89* Defendant had pi ed guilty to the crime of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
second decree *« ior-v •••-.•
 v . *:apter . ..ection 
8(1 • ' . , . .*-'•}, . /londay, April 11, i98s, after having waived 
the preliminary hearing on 'he proceeding bYioav, jpri± o, 1988. 
Defendant . * : after pleading 
guilty, anc ' ,ic v,<;. -he Honorable Dennis Frederick presiding, 
sentenced the defendant to serve one r< fifteen years i i the 1 It:ah 
State Pi: i soi i., ai ici pay ; i f i ne « :)f $ 5 , n 1 \ is a surcharge of $ 1,250 
with the commitment to be forthwith. Defendant moved to withdraw 
1 
his guilty plea on December 14, 1988• The Court denied the motion 
on February 13, 1989. Defendant was not present and moved to 
Vacate the Order on February 22, 1989. The Court denied that 
Motion on March 16, 1989, and defendant filed his notice of Appeal 
on March 23, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time the defendant appeared for preliminary hearing, he 
was represented by a public defender attorney. The prosecutor 
offered to allow the defendant to plead to count I of the 
information, Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute, a second degree felony and the prosecutor would move to 
dismiss Count II, Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted Person, a 
third degree felony. The prosecutor also stated that if the 
defendant did not want to accept the offer, he would look into 
amending the information to include an enhancement of sentence 
charge of being a habitual criminal in violation of Section 
76-8-1001 U.C.A., 1953. The defendant was so informed of the 
prosecutions position by his attorney, and the defendant agreed to 
accept the offer, and waived the preliminary hearing on Friday, 
April 8, 1988. The defendant was arraigned in District Court on 
the following Monday, April 11, 1988. He pled guilty to Count I 
and the State dismissed Count II. The defendant signed an 
"Affidavit of Defendant'1 which set forth the charge to which he was 
pleading, the degree of offense, the maximum penalty, the legal 
elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the factual 
2 
.  or.duct of the defendant which was "he -rriminal violation, the 
const. iiULionai rights the defendant wouia be living, and the 
• -;• e defe: si I'Diinse: ...d prosecutor. . ne affidavit also 
sci for;.. v. lea agreement o; mention, however, the 
State agreement ^or -- rmrsue a haciT\- r* t niii/in lcnl: 
lormation on wn; ;; ,:k- prosecution was 
founded cue no; :r.c.*.ci allegations of being a habitual criminal. 
The defendant had c-* - :• i 
..-*•, ne degree felony h<^  prosecutor had. no knowledge of any -ther 
convictions. \t the time of his arrest tor *ne nresent conviction, 
he was •.-..- . .: . * ;-.. •- n .-. , •" pound of 
methamphetamine, a schedule ;I controlled substance. 
SUMMARY OF DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT 
The defendant's argument for : he withdrawn j of his plea of 
guilty has ^ nasi;- , ±) His plea ui en: :. . - • • <• 
iri • 1 nn t a i: i I . -e cause of the ^hr^ai o; riling hi ' ;aDi;uai 
criminal charge,'1 ana 'J.) Defendant die not .ave the ssisranee of 
effective counsel. Defer 
subseqi lent t : conviction, because there is no time 1imit governing 
the withdrawal of a guilty plea^. 
But; for the threat ol I lie luhiliml c r i in i nu I t nihaneeiiieiit uinthi 
was not adequately explained to him,, defendant maintains he would 
have gone trial rather than pleac gui'tv r >ur: hie 
prosecutor it ..c :y • - s in I" i I c i - :...::..:. ...cga;.:on 
iSee State •. . ....» , „ ' ih P hi I II! hi, l"h«, i. 
3 
because defendant had not been twice previously convicted, as 
required by 76-8-1001 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, and if the 
prosecutor was going to amend, he would have had to have done so 
before the defendant's first appearance. He had already been 
before the magistrate and it was therefore unlikely that the 
prosecutor would have been successful in amending the information, 
even if the requiste number of convictions existed, which they did 
not. Further, the habitual criminal charge was not a separate 
offense as the defendant believed, and his attorney should have 
explained to him that it was simply an enhancement of sentence 
allegation. 
Had defendant known these facts, he would have been appraised 
of his situation and could have made a knowing and voluntary 
decision as to whether to accept the offer of the State. As it 
was, he did not know the actual situation, which was more favorable 
to his position than what he believed it to be, and consequently, 
he may not have entered the plea of guilty. Because his plea was 
not freely and voluntarily given, it should be vacated, and he 
should be granted a preliminary hearing. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE I T WAS NOT BASED ON A KNOWING AND 
VOLUNTARY PLEA OF GUILTY 
The d e f e n d a n t a id no t knowing ly and v o l u n t a r i i " n i e a i LTui::v t o 
t h e char-,.'. * ^ ^ q e ^ * ~ M| ,,, MnnU;i I I cd M. ^ ;. t c : t o 
D i s t r i b u t e , a v i o l a t i o n of S e c t i o n 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 U MrM . J . A . . "_-o3. He 
was unde r t h e m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n a t t h e t ime of h i s ;Mea -;-:,:: lie 
d i d n o t pi i. M ,u i I t v , t hi- S t d i t - would amend t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t o 
c h a r g e him w i t h b e i n g a h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l . He t h e r e f o r e conc luded 
t o p l e a d g u i l t y so a s t o avo id t h e po v- s M , *.• u 
w i t . ii . a s panther offe: i ; i t : , n^ •.-
 svi .u a n o t h e r 
s e n t e n c e for v i e M i i ;i *-: : \p r : -;ie . 
i : i C Ld&e o i 1M a b r ; v , J o l insun • „ I in III S. Mi pi LMIIIU I NIJI I 
s t a t u * /.at-
[ - : defenda nt w a s n o t f airly apprised of its 
consequences, his guilty plea can be challenged under the 
Due Process Clause. And when the prosecution breaches its 
promise with respect to an executed plea agreement, the 
defendant pleads guilty on a ral?e premise, and hence his 
conviction cannot stand. 
In the I nstarit case, defendar" aint^.ins that Miere were 
promises made which were nor kept bv M -j- hM own Mt~r-ev anu uy 
the |iros<-oHt or. "«*• • "• m»i ,;c.\ •. :;. :.nat ^he 
prosecaiu: ;du not. induced the habitual criminal allegations in 
24 67 II. S. M„Mi1( HI L.Ed. Mi 43/ !°8M. 
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the information already on file, and that he was bound to file the 
habitual criminal allegations at the time of filing the information 
pursuant to the procedure for habitual criminal charges, 76-8-1002 
U.C.A., 1953,3 and the provisions of 76-1-402(2)(b) U.C.A., 1953, 
which requires the prosecutor to proceed in one information on all 
charges known to him at the time of arraignment of the defendant • 
While defendant had agreed to plead to the one count prior to the 
preliminary hearing, he maintains that he did so only because of 
the promise not to file the habitual criminal charge. Had his 
attorney explained the elements of the habitual criminal charge, he 
would not have been under a misapprehension of the potential 
penalty in the case, and would have been better able to determine 
what kind of plea was in his best interests. 
In the case of Fontaine v. United States,4 the Supreme Court 
stated that ,fit is elementary that a coerced plea is open to 
collateral attack. "5 In the case of Stantobello v. New York^, the 
U. S. Supreme Court vacated a defendants plea of guilty based on a 
plea agreement, because the prosecutor had agreed not to make a 
recommendation of sentence, and at the time of sentencing another 
prosecutor inadvertently recommended the imposition of a maximum 
376-8-1002. (1) In charging a person with being a habitual 
criminal, the information or complaint filed before the committing 
magistrate shall allege the felony committed within the state of 
Utah and the two or more felony convictions relied upon by the 
state of Utah. 
4411 U. S. 213, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973). 
5at 411 U.S. 215, 93 S.Ct. 1462. 
6404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct.495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). 
6 
sentence. The defendant immediately moved to set aside his guilty 
plea and the trial judge denied the motion, assuring the defendant 
that he was not influenced by the prosecutor's recommendation, 
thereafter sentencing the defendant to a maximum period of 
incarceration. In vacating the sentence, the Supreme Court said 
that any promises made as an inducement for the defendant's guilty 
plea must be fulfilled or there was no agreement for the entry of 
the plea.^. 
In the case of Machibroda v. United S ta tes^ , the Supreme Court, 
quoting from the case of Kercheval v. United S ta tes^ , said that 
[a] p lea of g u i l t y d i f f e r s in purpose and effect from a 
mere admission or an e x t r a - j u d i c i a l con fe s s ion ; i t i s 
i t s e l f a c o n v i c t i o n . Like a v e r d i c t of a ju ry i t i s 
conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to 
do b u t g i v e j u d g m e n t and s e n t e n c e . Out of j u s t 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n for persons accused of a crime, courts are 
careful tha t a plea of gu i l ty shal l not be accepted unless 
made v o l u n t a r i l y a f t e r p r o p e r a d v i c e and w i th f u l l 
understanding of the consequences. 
And in the case of S t a t e v . Gallegos, lQ the Utah Supreme Court 
s ta ted that 
[b]ecause the entry of such a plea [of guilty] constitutes 
such a waiver [of important constitutional rights], and 
because the prosecution will generally be unable to show 
that it will suffer any significant prejudice if the plea 
is withdrawn, a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea should, in general, be liberally granted. 
In evaluating the reasons advanced for a presentence motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea, we accept the view that trial 
7id, at 449. 
8368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510 (1962). 
^274 U.S. 220, 223. 
IO738 P.2d 1040 (Utah, 1987). 
7 
courts should not attempt to decide the merits of a claim 
related directly to the merits of the charge against the 
defendant, thus passing on the question of his guilt or 
innocence. 
While the instant case involves a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
after sentencing, defendant submits there is a compelling and 
substantial reason for doing so. He waived important 
constitutional rights in anticipation of foregoing a more harsh 
sentence, when in fact, he would not have received a more harsh 
sentence. His sentence could not have been enhanced. 
In the case of State v. Stillingll, the defendant was sentenced 
to two concurrent sentences for aggravated robbery and being a 
habitual criminal. The defendant appealed and the Utah Supreme 
Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing because 
the court erred in sentencing the defendant separately for the 
habitual criminal violation. The Supreme Court, in the unanimous 
opinion of the court written by Chief Justice Hall, stated that 
[t]his Court has consistently held that "the [habitual 
criminal] statute fdoes not create a new crime; it merely 
enhances punishment1 for the latest crime'1 [citations 
omitted]. Since no crime exists, there can be no sentence. 
Assigning a separate sentence for recidivism does more than 
enhance punishment for the latest crime, it penalizes an 
individual for past convictions. We see no reason to 
depart from the logic and consistency of cited precedent 
just because it is difficult to imagine that one sentence 
is enhanced when it is overlaid with an identical sentence. 
Defendant should have received a single sentence of five 
years to life for aggravated robbery and for being a 
habitual criminal. 
While the sentence imposed for defendant's plea was a second 
degree felony sentence of one to fifteen years, and the habitual 
1*770 P.2d 137, 145 (Utah, 1989). 
criminal allegation would have enhanced that sentence to five years 
to life imprisonment, there was no basis for filing a habitual 
criminal allegation. Defendant did not meet the criteria of the 
habitual criminal statute. He had not been twice previously 
convicted, and the habitual criminal allegation was not filed with 
the original information. Had defendant been appraised of those 
facts he could have made a determination of his situation in a 
knowing manner and decided whether to accept the offer of the State 
or not. 
The State1s threat to charge defendant with being a habitual 
criminal is particularly egregious because the State did not have a 
record of defendant's convictions which met the criteria. 
Furthermore, the State had no knowledge as to whether defendant had 
been represented by counsel at the time of his conviction for the 
one prior offense of robbery.12 
Lastly, the affidavit of the defendant did not set forth the 
fact that the State was foregoing an opportunity to amend the 
information to allege the habitual criminal enhancement. Hence, 
the affidavit did not set forth the facts upon which the plea was 
being entered. Section 77-35-11 U.C.A., 1953, requires that the 
Court ensure that the plea discussion and agreement be set forth: 
12The case of State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah, 
1989), held that the defendant has the burden of raising the issue 
of whether he had counsel or effectively waived the right to 
counsel at the time of conviction of prior crimes which form the 
basis for the habitual criminal allegation, after which the state 
has the burden of proving that the defendant did waive counsel or 
had counsel at the time of those convictions. 
9 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a 
prior plea discussion and plea agreement and if 
so, what agreement has been reached. 
In the case of State v. Gibbons, id, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
[t]he details of any plea bargain should be set 
forth in the affidavit, as well as a disclaimer 
concerning any sentencing recommendations as 
required by Rule 11(e). 
The Court also stated that the burden of "establishing compliance 
with those requirements" is "on the trial judge. It is not 
sufficient to assume that defense attorneys make sure that their 
clients fully understand the contents of the affidavit. "13 The 
affidavit of the defendant did not meet the requirements of Rule 
11. It did not mention the State's promise not to amend the 
information to include the habitual criminal allegations. The 
Court did not inquire as to whether the affidavit was complete, and 
included the entire plea agreement of the parties. Hence, the 
Court did not fulfill its burden of determining the plea to be 
freely and voluntarily given, and defendant's motion to withdraw 
his plea should be granted and the sentence vacated. 
In the case of Mosher v. LaVallee^ the defendant was told by 
his public defender counsel that the judge had agreed to impose a 
lenient sentence in exchange for his plea of guilty. This was in 
fact not true. 
When Mosher pled guilty before Judge Trainor, he 
was specifically asked by the Court whether any 
13id, at 60 Utah Advance Reports 38. 
14351 F.Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y., 1972). 
10 
promises or th rea t s had been made to induce him 
to plead gu i l t y . Mosher gave a negative answer. 
His at torney said nothing. 
Whi l e t h i s must be t a k e n i n t o accoun t in 
e v a l u a t i n g Mosher !s c o n t e n t i o n , i t i s not of 
cont ro l l ing weight or s ignif icance.15 
Likewise , the fact that nei ther Mr. Luschen nor his attorney 
mentioned the h a b i t u a l c r imina l promise i s not of c o n t r o l l i n g 
weight in t h i s case. 
J u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t e n s i o n s s u r r o u n d i n g 
acceptance of pleas makes i t impossible to decide 
wi thout a hearing that defendant understood the 
s ignif icance of the D i s t r i c t Attorney's statement 
for the record t h a t no promise was made. But 
even i f t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d h e a r and d i d 
comprehend, h i s f a i l u r e to cha l lenge when his 
at torney stood mute i s not conclusive evidence of 
acquiescence. . . . [T]he defendant usually 
answers in the negat ive, and the prosecutor and 
d e f e n s e c o u n s e l s e l d o m i n d i c a t e t o t h e 
contrary.16 
Obviously, the defendant is not in a posi t ion at the time of 
sentencing to contradic t what i s s ta ted in the aff idavi t when his 
at torney says nothing about the habi tual criminal charge. 
POINT I I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF EFFECTIVE COUNSEL 
AT THE TIME OF HIS WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY HEARING 
AND ENTRY OF GUILTY PLEA, AND HIS CONVICTION 
SHOULD BE VACATED 
The defendant would not now be filing this appeal were he 
adequately appraised of the State's inability to have filed the 
1967) 
1 5 i d . , a t 1107 . 
1 6 U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Mancus i , 275 F . S u p p . 5 0 8 , 519 ( E . D . N . Y . , 
11 
habitual criminal allegation. It goes without: argument that 
defendant was not adequately represented at the time of his 
preliminary hearing and plea of guilty. 
No one will question that the right of an accused 
to counsel means by a competent member of the Bar 
who shows a willingness to identify himself with 
and represent the interests of the defendant in 
good faith.17 
In the case of United States v. Easter,18 the court stated that 
[i]n order to assert a Sixth Amendment infirmity 
on this ground . . . the circumstances must 
demonstrate that which amounts to a lawyer's 
deliberate abdication of his ethical duty to his 
client. There must be such conscious conduct as 
to render pretextual an attorney's legal 
obligation to fairly represent the defendant. 
Defendant submits that such was the case here. While defense 
counsel states in paragraph five of his affidavit that he 
reiterated the conversation with the prosecutor about the filing of 
the habitual criminal charge, and related to the defendant the 
"nature of an [sic] habitual criminal allegation.!f Yet, no where 
does the defense counsel state that he explained to the defendant 
or made inquiry as to whether there was grounds to file such a 
charge, or whether the state would be allowed to amend after the 
initial appearance to file such a charge. In the case of McAleney 
v. United States1^ the Court stated that 
[t]here is accordingly a duty on attorneys to 
make sure whenever participating in plea 
bargaining proceedings, which are under the close 
17State v. Turner, 22 U.2d 294, 452 P.2d 323, 324 (1969) 
18539 F.2d 663 (8 Cir., 1976) 
1^539 F.2d 282 (1st District, 1976). 
12 
scrutiny of the court, that any information they 
convey to their client is accurate and complete 
and that they understand what the applicable law 
and rules are. 
Obviously, defense counsel did not meet this test in the 
instant case. If he had explained to the defendant how groundless 
the State's threat was, the defendant would not have been under the 
apprehension of having a more serious offense charged against him. 
In the case of Codianna v. Morris,20 the Utah Supreme Court 
stated the three factors to be considered in determining competency 
of defense counsel: (1) the burden is on the defendant to show by 
proof of a demonstrable reality and not a speculative nature that 
his counsel was ineffective^; (2) the attorney's "legitimate 
exercise of judgment" in the trial strategy which does not produce 
the results desired, does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel and (3) the deficiency of counsel must be prejudicial22
 # 
Defendant's counsel was ineffective according to the Codianna tests 
because: (1) the defense counsel's own affidavit offered by the 
State at the time of arguing the Motion to Withdraw the guilty plea 
demonstrates that the defendant was not told that the habitual 
20660 P.2d 1101 (Utah, 1983). 
21As stated in State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217 (Utah, App. 
1988), this means "showing that counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 
22This means, as stated in State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217 
(Utah App. 1988), that "defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 667 (1984). 
13 
criminal allegation criteria did not apply to him. (2) There was 
no strategy or tactic utilized beyond pleading guilty so as to 
avoid the State's threat of amending the information to allege the 
habitual criminal charge, and (3) the result certainly would have 
been different if defendant had known that he could not be charged 
as a habitual criminal. 
In State v. Geary23, the standard in plea bargaining cases is 
stated as 
whether information, evidence, or a defense which 
would cast a reasonable doubt of defendant's 
guilt was available, but was not revealed due to 
counsel's lack of investigation of the case.24-
Clearly, a more thorough investigation would have revealed that the 
defendant had not been twice previously convicted of a felony, and 
that even if the committing magistrate had allowed the information 
to be amended to assert the habitual criminal allegation, he would 
have been able to counsel the defendant that the threat of the 
amendment was without merit because he did not have the requisite 
previous conviction record. The defense counsel in this case 
apparently counseled with defendant immediately prior to the 
preliminary hearing on a Friday, determined that the defendant 
wanted to plead guilty after telling him about the prosecutor's 
threat regarding habitual criminal charges, and then stood with 
him at the further proceedings, including arraignment and sentence 
23707 P.2d 645 (Utah, 1985). 
24id, at 647. See also State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah, 
1988) which cites McGeary as the case giving the proper standard 
for a plea bargain situation. 
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which were on the following Monday. The attorney certainly failed 
to meet the test of competent counsel defined by a long line of 
Utah cases: 
[t]he accused is entitled to the assistance of a 
competent member of the Bar, who shows a 
willingness to identify himself with the 
interests of the defendant and present such 
defense that are available to him under the law 
and consistent with the ethics of the profession. 
This requirement is not fulfilled by a sham or 
pretense of an appearance on the record, by an 
attorney, who manifests no real concern about the 
interests of the accused.25 
If counsel had identified himself with his client's interests, he 
would have inquired into the defendant's criminal background, if 
any, and then confronted the prosecutor with the facts — there was 
no grounds for alleging a habitual criminal. If the prosecutor 
thought he had a weak case, he undoubtedly would have made another 
offer to the defendant. As it was, the defendant plead under a 
misapprehension, and without knowledge of the facts. If the 
defendant had still desired to accept the offer, at least he would 
have known the situation which actually existed. As the United 
States Supreme Court stated in Strickland v. Washington,26 
Because of the vital importance of counsel's assistance, 
this Court has held that, with certain exceptions, a person 
accused of a federal or state crime has the right to have 
counsel appointed if retained counsel cannot be obtained 
[citations omitted]. that a person who happens to be a 
lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, 
is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command. 
25Andreason v. Turner, 27 U.2d 182, 493 P.2d 1278 (1972). 
26466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692. 
15 
The defendants attorney did little more than be present when 
defendant was before the magistrate. 27 ye w a s not effective in 
presenting the defendant's alternatives, or in counseling the 
defendant as to the law applicable to the facts. 
27See also, Alires v. Turner, 449 P.2d 241, 243 (Utah, 1969) 
Mthe right of an accused to have counsel as assured by Section 12, 
Art. I, Utah Constitution, [footnote omitted] and by the VI and XIV 
Amendments to the U. S. Constitution [footnote omitted] is one of 
those rights 'rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people1 as essential to the protection of individual liberties and 
therefore included in our concept of due process of law [footnote 
omitted]. The requirement is not satisfied by a sham or pretense 
of an appearance in the record by an attorney who manifests no real 
concern about the interests of the accused. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant was under a false assumption based upon the 
threat of the prosecutor that he could be charged with being a 
habitual criminal, and subject to an additional five to life 
sentence. Hence, his decision to plead guilty to Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with intent to Distribute as charged, in 
exchange for the dismissal of the lesser crime of Possession of a 
Firearm by a Restricted Person was not freely and voluntarily 
entered. Had his counsel properly advised the defendant regarding 
the Habitual Criminal requirements, a different result may have 
occurred. Defendant is entitled under the Sixth Amendment and 
Section 12 of Article I of the Utah Constitution to be granted his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and the Court erred in denying 
that motion. Consequently, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's decision and remand for further proceedings, including a 
preliminary hearing. 
Respectfully presented, 
17 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
*f* *l* *i* n* n* *l* *l* *n 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
STUART DEAN LUSCHEN, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK MOHLMAN 
Case No. CR88-020 
* * * * * * * * 
COUNTY OF TOOELE ) 
Comes now, Affiant, having been previously sworn, and deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. That he is an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah and that 
he is currently in private practice, having his place of business in Tooele City, Toode County, 
Utah. That Affiant has practiced law on a full-time basis since Sct^n/>u:r*\ /^7-7 and 
that a large portion of that practice has consisted of criminal defense work. That since 
"£6£JA£s/t lc/#6> , the law firm in which affiant is a partner has had a contract with 
Tooele County to provide one-half of the indigent defense work needed in the County. 
2. That as pan of his contractual duties with Tooele County, Affiant was 
appointed to act as attorney for Defendant, Stuan Dean Luschen, in the above-named case. 
That by reason of said appointment, affiant contacted Defendant Luschen prior to :he date of 
Defendant's initial appearance before a committing magistrate. 
3. That prior to the time Defendant waived preliminary hearing, Affiant had 
received from the prosecution copies of the police reports and other documentary evidence in 
the possession of the prosecution. That Affiant examined those documents and discussed with 
Defendant the charges pending against him and the evidence then possessed by the State. 
4. That in the course of the conversations between Affiant and Defendant, 
Defendant indicated to Affiant that he had committed the acts alleged against him by the, 
prosecution and that he, Defendant, simply wanted to enter a plea of guilty and bejjin serving 
whatever sentence the Court may impose. 
5. That as part of Affiant's investigation of the allegations then pending 
against Defendant, Affiant spoke with Mark W. Nash, Deputy Tooele County Attorney. Priori 
to the waiver of the preliminary hearing, Mr. Nash indicated to Affiant that the State was 
looking into the possibility of filing habitual criminal allegations against Defendant. At the 
time of that conversation, no such allegations had been filed with the committing magistrate 
and Mr. Nash indicated to affiant that if Defendant desired to enter a plea of guilty to the 
Second Degree Felony charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to 
Distribute the State would not make any attempt to file habitual criminal allegations against 
Defendant and would move to dismiss the Third Degree Felony then pending against 
Defendant. Affiant related to Defendant the nature and contents of the conversation he had 
had with Mr. Nash and explained to Defendant the nature of an habitual criminal allegation 
o 
and answered such questions as Defendant had. Defendant reiterated his desire to plead guilty 
to the Second Degree Felony charge and get on with whatever sentence the Court may impose. 
On April 8, 1988, Defendant, accompanied by Affiant, appeared before Judge 
Edward A. Watson of the Sixth Circuit Court at which time Defendant waived his right to a 
preliminary hearing after having been admonished by Judge Watson as to the nature and 
purpose of a preliminary hearing. 
5. Prior to the time Defendant waived preliminary hearing, Affiant had 
examined documentation received by him from the prosecution and had made a determination 
that probable cause existed for the filing of the charges then pending against Defendant 
(Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute and Possession of a Firearm 
by a Restricted Person). From the facts then available to Affiant, sufficient evidence existed 
against Defendant so as to allow the matter to be presented to a jury and so as to allow a 
reasonable jury to reach a finding of guilt on both charges. At no time did Affiant tell 
Defendant that he would be convicted of what ever he was charged with, including an habitual 
criminal charge. Affiant went over the evidence then in possession of the State with 
Defendant and gave Defendant a fair and professional assessment of the evidence. 
6. At no time did Affiant promise Defendant that he would bring this matter 
before the Court about 3 months after the entry of guilty plea nor was any such request made 
of Affiant by Defendant. Affiant can recall no conversation with Defendant concerning 
concurrent or consecutive sentences or concerning a review of the sentence after Defendant 
was sentenced in California, except as contained in the transcript of the arraignment and 
3 
sentencing and in the Affidavit signed by Defendant at time he entered his guilty plea. 
Affiant has carefully examined both the transcript and the Affidavit and states that those 
documents present a complete representation of the proceedings before the District Court on 
vpnl 11, 1988 Atfiant states that he went over the Affidavit of Defendant with Defendant 
thoroughly and carefully, pnor to the time Defendant entered his guilty plea, and answered all 
questions Defendant may have had concerning the contents of the Affidavit. Defendant 
appeared to have a full understanding ot his constitutional nghts and Defendant understood 
that he was waiving those nghts by pleading guilty At no time did Defendant clam that he 
was pleading guilty because of any threat, coersion or promise except as contained in the 
Affidavit of Defendant. 
7 At no time did Affiant advise Counsel to misrepresent any fact to the 
Court and specifically Affiant did not advise Defendant to fallaciously indicate that no 
promises or threats had been made. 
8. Following Defendant's plea of guilty and sentencing by the District Court, 
Affiant closed his file in the above-named case and cannot recall being contacted by any 
messenger on behalf of Defendant, either in person, by telephone, or in wnting. 
9. At no time did Atfiant collude with the prosecution in an attempt to 
obtain Defendant's plea of guilty. Affiant fully represented to Defendant all conversations 
between himself and the prosecuting attorney and, to the best of his ability, fully and 
accurately represented the nature and extent of the evidence held by the Stare. When 
Defendant indicated to Atfiant that Defendant desired to be sentenced immediately after entry 
4 
of a guilty plea, Affiant informed Defendant that he would very likely be sent to the Utah 
State Prison. Affiant discussed with Defendant the possibility of obtaining a presentence 
report from the Department of Adult Probation and Parole and the purpose of such an 
mvesugation but Defendant persisted in his desire to be sentence*/immediately. 
10. To the best of Affiant's knowledge, Defendant understood the naiure of the 
allegations against him, the extent and nature of the evidence held by the State against him, 
the nature of the plea negotiation offered by the State, the elements of the charges filed 
against him, and Defendant understood all of his constitutional nghts as set fonh in the 
Affidavit of Defendant and knowingly and intelligently waived those nghts pnor :o entry of 
his guilty plea. 
DATED this ^ ° day of ^'£/?c//}/?y , 1989. 
FRANK T. MOHLMAN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this O — day of 
~^):(/: t^i *.<< 1989. 
// 
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